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Dec
11

The Monopoly-like infusion of liquidity to finance climate measures

Post By gaia1 in Climate crisis

On December 9 I submitted to the Copenhagen conference my message to its leaders:

Let nations and parties to the COP15 agree to allocate carbon emissions permits on an equal basis and turn them into liquidity by creating a carbon account in their balance of payments. 

 

One of the most important elements of climate finance at the Copenhagen conference is the availability of funds for financing mitigation and adaptation measures. All parties are in need of more funds, even the richer parties in the global North. They are demanded to transfer funds from their weakened economies to assist the even weaker economies in the global South. Does the world carbon market going to provide those $200 billions by 2020 continue providing them on an annual basis there after?

 

If the private carbon market is supposed to be the main source of revenue as source of these funds as part of the cap-and-trade arrangements in the global North, the question arises whether this market route would deliver a fair, effective and reliable climate financing system in the short, medium and long term. Who would be the main beneficiaries of this carbon market system? How are nations in the South who are ecological creditors on account of past and present “atmospheric occupation” going to benefit?

 

Increasing amount of evidence shows that cap-and-trade fails to deliver significant GHG reductions. James Hansen’s OPED article in the New York Times of December 7 presents some strong reasons against cap-and-trade and in favor of “fee and dividend”. In a more popular fashion a recent 10 minute video of the cap and trade watch project of the Transnational Institute makes the same point. Its various publications provide documented background for the credibility of the video. So, cap-and-trade is not an effective carbon reduction methodology and, thus, those billions of dollars to finance cannot be reliably attached to the resolution of the climate crisis. A secondary reason is also the process and structure of this carbon market that is dominated by large financial corporations which are weakly regulated in existing financial products and services, let alone in an emerging market like the carbon one.

 

Enter the Tierra Cap & Share approach and its monetary architecture that is based upon a carbon-based international reserve currency. This approach starts out with a monopoly-like infusion of liquidity by allocating to every adult an equal amount of carbon emissions permits which become carbon reserve currency in a nation’s balance of payments. Note what happened if the COP 15, 16 or 17 parties were to adopt this monopoly-like infusion of liquidity as a public capital infusion to combat climate change.

 

Monetarily: it would introduce a new reserve currency, so that nations would not need to hold expensive dollars in their reserve systems, so they could use those dollars, euros for more productive purposes. Given the failure of the present floating exchange system, even acknowledged by the Economist (January 6, 1990) and the Financial Times (February 17, 1987), this dramatic infusion of liquidity cannot make this failed system more failed.

 

Economically: freed-up hard currency reserves can now be used for combating mitigation and adaptation measures without depending on the funds generated by the cap-and-trade systems, where, unfortunately, too great an amount of carbon permits were grandfathered rather than auctioned.

 

Financially: this infusion of limited liquidity—limited because of this carbon currency being a reserve currency—would escape the grip of the large international financial corporations which would be among the main beneficiaries of the private climate financing.

 

Ecologically: in one swoop which could be repeated annually under an ever tightening cap, climate change could be effectively combated.

 

Politically: agreeing to this infusion of these monetized carbon credits would show boldness and statesmanship towards monetary cooperation, that eventually may lead to a transformed international monetary system based upon an updated Bretton Woods Conference as proposed by Paul Davison in 2008 and Bill Lucarelli in 2009 or as proposed by the International Institute of Monetary Transformation which proposes a carbon account in a nation’s payments schedule with its Bancor2 carbon reduction methodology.

 

Socially: such major monetary step will build confidence in the future and comity among nations.

 

Ethically: the equal allocation of these monetized carbon permits would be a fair deal, though countries in the global South could demand additional permits given the atmospheric occupation of the industrialized countries during the last couple of centuries.

 

An article dealing with the What, Why and How of this Monopoly-like infusion of liquidity for climate finance will go into greater depth. Stay tuned.

 

 

 

THE MONOPOLY INFUSION OF LIQUIDITY

 

On December 9 I submitted to the Copenhagen conference my message to its leaders:

Let nations and parties to the COP15 agree to allocate carbon emissions permits on an equal basis and turn them into liquidity by creating a carbon account in their balance of payments. 

 

One of the most important elements of climate finance at the Copenhagen conference is the availability of funds for financing mitigation and adaptation measures. All parties are in need of more funds, even the richer parties in the global North. They are demanded to transfer funds from their weakened economies to assist the even weaker economies in the global South. Does the world carbon market going to provide those $200 billions by 2020 continue providing them on an annual basis there after?

 

If the private carbon market is supposed to be the main source of revenue as source of these funds as part of the cap-and-trade arrangements in the global North, the question arises whether this market route would deliver a fair, effective and reliable climate financing system in the short, medium and long term. Who would be the main beneficiaries of this carbon market system? How are nations in the South who are ecological creditors on account of past and present “atmospheric occupation” going to benefit?

 

Increasing amount of evidence shows that cap-and-trade fails to deliver significant GHG reductions. James Hansen’s OPED article in the New York Times of December 7 presents some strong reasons against cap-and-trade and in favor of “fee and dividend”. In a more popular fashion a recent 10 minute video of the cap and trade watch project of the Transnational Institute makes the same point. Its various publications provide documented background for the credibility of the video. So, cap-and-trade is not an effective carbon reduction methodology and, thus, those billions of dollars to finance cannot be reliably attached to the resolution of the climate crisis. A secondary reason is also the process and structure of this carbon market that is dominated by large financial corporations which are weakly regulated in existing financial products and services, let alone in an emerging market like the carbon one.

 

Enter the Tierra Cap & Share approach and its monetary architecture that is based upon a carbon-based international reserve currency. This approach starts out with a monopoly-like infusion of liquidity by allocating to every adult an equal amount of carbon emissions permits which become carbon reserve currency in a nation’s balance of payments. Note what happened if the COP 15, 16 or 17 parties were to adopt this monopoly-like infusion of liquidity as a public capital infusion to combat climate change.

 

Monetarily: it would introduce a new reserve currency, so that nations would not need to hold expensive dollars in their reserve systems, so they could use those dollars, euros for more productive purposes. Given the failure of the present floating exchange system, even acknowledged by the Economist (January 6, 1990) and the Financial Times (February 17, 1987), this dramatic infusion of liquidity cannot make this failed system more failed.

 

Economically: freed-up hard currency reserves can now be used for combating mitigation and adaptation measures without depending on the funds generated by the cap-and-trade systems, where, unfortunately, too great an amount of carbon permits were grandfathered rather than auctioned.

 

Financially: this infusion of limited liquidity—limited because of this carbon currency being a reserve currency—would escape the grip of the large international financial corporations which would be among the main beneficiaries of the private climate financing.

 

Ecologically: in one swoop which could be repeated annually under an ever tightening cap, climate change could be effectively combated.

 

Politically: agreeing to this infusion of these monetized carbon credits would show boldness and statesmanship towards monetary cooperation, that eventually may lead to a transformed international monetary system based upon an updated Bretton Woods Conference as proposed by Paul Davison in 2008 and Bill Lucarelli in 2009 or as proposed by the International Institute of Monetary Transformation which proposes a carbon account in a nation’s payments schedule with its Bancor2 carbon reduction methodology.

 

Socially: such major monetary step will build confidence in the future and comity among nations.

 

Ethically: the equal allocation of these monetized carbon permits would be a fair deal, though countries in the global South could demand additional permits given the atmospheric occupation of the industrialized countries during the last couple of centuries.

 

An article dealing with the What, Why and How of this Monopoly-like infusion of liquidity for climate finance will go into greater depth. Stay tuned.

 

 

 

THE MONOPOLY INFUSION OF LIQUIDITY

 

On December 9 I submitted to the Copenhagen conference my message to its leaders:

Let nations and parties to the COP15 agree to allocate carbon emissions permits on an equal basis and turn them into liquidity by creating a carbon account in their balance of payments. 

 

One of the most important elements of climate finance at the Copenhagen conference is the availability of funds for financing mitigation and adaptation measures. All parties are in need of more funds, even the richer parties in the global North. They are demanded to transfer funds from their weakened economies to assist the even weaker economies in the global South. Does the world carbon market going to provide those $200 billions by 2020 continue providing them on an annual basis there after?

 

If the private carbon market is supposed to be the main source of revenue as source of these funds as part of the cap-and-trade arrangements in the global North, the question arises whether this market route would deliver a fair, effective and reliable climate financing system in the short, medium and long term. Who would be the main beneficiaries of this carbon market system? How are nations in the South who are ecological creditors on account of past and present “atmospheric occupation” going to benefit?

 

Increasing amount of evidence shows that cap-and-trade fails to deliver significant GHG reductions. James Hansen’s OPED article in the New York Times of December 7 presents some strong reasons against cap-and-trade and in favor of “fee and dividend”. In a more popular fashion a recent 10 minute video of the cap and trade watch project of the Transnational Institute makes the same point. Its various publications provide documented background for the credibility of the video. So, cap-and-trade is not an effective carbon reduction methodology and, thus, those billions of dollars to finance cannot be reliably attached to the resolution of the climate crisis. A secondary reason is also the process and structure of this carbon market that is dominated by large financial corporations which are weakly regulated in existing financial products and services, let alone in an emerging market like the carbon one.

 

Enter the Tierra Cap & Share approach and its monetary architecture that is based upon a carbon-based international reserve currency. This approach starts out with a monopoly-like infusion of liquidity by allocating to every adult an equal amount of carbon emissions permits which become carbon reserve currency in a nation’s balance of payments. Note what happened if the COP 15, 16 or 17 parties were to adopt this monopoly-like infusion of liquidity as a public capital infusion to combat climate change.

 

Monetarily: it would introduce a new reserve currency, so that nations would not need to hold expensive dollars in their reserve systems, so they could use those dollars, euros for more productive purposes. Given the failure of the present floating exchange system, even acknowledged by the Economist (January 6, 1990) and the Financial Times (February 17, 1987), this dramatic infusion of liquidity cannot make this failed system more failed.

 

Economically: freed-up hard currency reserves can now be used for combating mitigation and adaptation measures without depending on the funds generated by the cap-and-trade systems, where, unfortunately, too great an amount of carbon permits were grandfathered rather than auctioned.

 

Financially: this infusion of limited liquidity—limited because of this carbon currency being a reserve currency—would escape the grip of the large international financial corporations which would be among the main beneficiaries of the private climate financing.

 

Ecologically: in one swoop which could be repeated annually under an ever tightening cap, climate change could be effectively combated.

 

Politically: agreeing to this infusion of these monetized carbon credits would show boldness and statesmanship towards monetary cooperation, that eventually may lead to a transformed international monetary system based upon an updated Bretton Woods Conference as proposed by Paul Davison in 2008 and Bill Lucarelli in 2009 or as proposed by the International Institute of Monetary Transformation which proposes a carbon account in a nation’s payments schedule with its Bancor2 carbon reduction methodology.

 

Socially: such major monetary step will build confidence in the future and comity among nations.

 

Ethically: the equal allocation of these monetized carbon permits would be a fair deal, though countries in the global South could demand additional permits given the atmospheric occupation of the industrialized countries during the last couple of centuries.

 

An article dealing with the What, Why and How of this Monopoly-like infusion of liquidity for climate finance will go into greater depth. Stay tuned.